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- 1.. The Yugoslav Party Congress became an important event in the development of Titoist Yugoslavia, insofar as it confirms a change of strategy: Yugoslavia has abandoned her former attempts at an autonomous foreign policy, and has now linked her foreign policy to the West. Edvard Kardelj, in his speech following Marshal Tito's report, stated that the "Union of Yugoslav Communists" (a title borrowed from an early Marxist formula) is seeking closer links to the Social Democratic parties in Europe. He hinted that a formalization of Yugoslav Communists' relations to the Socialist International might become desirable later on. This is in contrast to the anti-Social Democratic attitude of the Yugoslav Party in the first phase after its break with Moscow, (1949-1950). A Communist observer, however, might add that Tito is following here the latest tactical decision of Moscow, favoring a united front with the Socialists as decided upon by the Nineteenth Russian Communist Party Congress.
2. However, the Yugoslav Government will hesitate to bind itself firmly to the Socialist International, or to the British Labor Party, etc., and will prefer, while they are in power, good relations with the Churchill government and Chancellor Adenauer rather than with the British Labor Party or the German Social Democrats. Yugoslavia's nearest neighbors, the Italian Socialists cannot become partners because of the Yugoslav-Italian antagonism, and the French Socialists who are losing influence at home are not being honored beyond personal contacts or occasional exchange of articles. In the event of Social Democratic governments in West Germany and France and a Labor government in Britain, the reorientation of the Yugoslav Communists might become a major factor in European Politics.

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3. The problem of relations between the Yugoslav Communists and the Asian Socialist parties (the Japanese, Indian, Indochinese, and Burmese) is more pressing. The Yugoslav Communist government is making great efforts all over Southeast Asia to achieve good contacts with the local Socialist organizations, but they are running into increasing difficulty there because of the problems of North Korea and China. At the last Socialist International Conference in Milan in October, there almost occurred a split because the Asian Socialists demanded an autonomous organization in which they could shape their policy without consideration of the Western Socialist parties.
 4. The gist of Tito's and Kardelj's statements on foreign policy, however, was not the announcement of this rapprochement with the Socialist International but a full endorsement of American policy concerning Korea, China, and Germany. Kardelj also recommended a speedy ending of the Korean war, to be followed by recognition of Communist China, because the expansion of trade between China and the capitalist world might become a major factor in refuting Stalin's theory of the two antagonistic world markets. This statement, however, that the aggressive policy of the Soviet Government represents the biggest and most immediate menace to peace probably made an understanding between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Asian Socialist movements more difficult. He certainly angered the Chinese Communist Party, which will not accept any responsibility for the Korean war.
 5. This record of recent Yugoslav foreign policy explains why Titoism has lost a great deal of its former appeal to the East European Communists. When the Yugoslav Communist Party broke with Moscow in 1948, the situation in East Europe was still fluid. At that time, there still existed the old Comintern concept of an autonomous East European and Balkan Federation, embracing 80 to 90 million people, which might become strong enough to keep a balance between Russia and Germany. This conception of an East European Federation was bound to that of a united Socialist Germany, against which the East European Communists would have to maintain for some time a cautious reserve. Tito, it must be remembered, had toyed with this idea in cooperation with Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria, and the East European Federation was attractive to National Communists like Rajk of Hungary, Kostov of Bulgaria, and Wladyslaw Gomułka of Poland. By now, these National Communists have been thoroughly liquidated, their cadres destroyed, their contacts broken. The concept of an East European Federation has become unrealizable, since the frontiers of a divided Europe are firmly set, and no prospect of a change is in sight.
 6. Kardelj was aware of this state of affairs, and preferred to speak in vague terms about Russia's liberation by a genuine workers' revolution instead of calling for immediate action in Poland or Czechoslovakia. The Communist regimes in East Europe have, in the course of the last years, become closely tied to the apparatus of the Russian economic, military, and political system, and their break with Russia, still possible in 1945, could only result now in the overthrow of the Communist regimes, not in their reform on the Titoite pattern. East European Communist parties are now less disposed than ever to rally around Yugoslavia, whose prestige has declined since it became intimately linked to the United States. Since Mao's victory became stabilized the East European Communists prefer a combination with the Moscow-Peiping axis, to an alliance with Yugoslavia. The East European

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Communist Parties were horrified to hear Kardelj's statements on China and Germany, and do not see how they could find their place or satisfy their economic interests in a realignment with Tito.

7. The reorganization of the Yugoslav "Executive Committee" (taking the place of the old Politburo) is similar to the concurrent reorganization of the leading bodies of the Russian Communist Party and the Secretariat legalizes the dictatorial triumvirate of Tito-Kardelj-Djilas. The Tito regime now represents a medley of the Stalinist Party and state features, with a somewhat stronger emphasis on industrial and local democracy. But the real difference separating it from the other European Communist states is its foreign policy.

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